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Pacht: The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions in a Continuing

THE FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL DILEMMA:
NEW DIMENSIONS IN A CONTINUING STRUGGLE
Courts and commentators have struggled to find a solution to
what has commonly been referred to as the free press-fair trial controversy. 1 Although press coverage of criminal proceedings can
create problems regarding a defendant's right to a fair trial, heretofore the Supreme Court has denounced any attempt directly to
abridge freedom of the press in this context. 2 In Gannett Co. v. De
Pasquale,3 the New York State Court of Appeals reviewed an open
question within the "controversy." The court considered whether,
consistent with the first amendment guarantee of a free press 4 and
the sixth amendment right to a public trial, 5 a trial judge can
exclude the press and the public from a pretrial suppression hearing to secure a fair trial. In answering in the affirmative, the court
triggered the next stage of development in this dispute. This note
will focus primarily on whether an exclusionary order constitutes a
prior restraint on the press's right to disseminate information 6 by
restricting its access to information. This discussion will also consider whether the first amendment provides any constitutional protection to the media for information gathering.
1. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242
(7th Cir. 1975); Barist, The First Amendment and Regulation of Prejudicial Publicity-An Analysis, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 425 (1968); Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free
Press:An Opportunityfor Coexistence, 29 STAN. L. REv. 561 (1977); Jaffe, Trial by

Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504 (1965); Larson & Murphy, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart-A Prosecutor's View of Pre-Trial Restraints on the Press, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 417 (1977).
2. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941). See also text accompanying notes 55-105 infra.
3. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1301).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of... the press .... "

5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial... This note will deal only tangentially
with the public trial question raised by the case.
6. A prior restraint on speech or publication prohibits expression or publication
of information. If the order operates as a prior restraint, then it is presumptively unconstitutional. See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
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On August 6, 1976, a Seneca County grand jury indicted Kyle
Greathouse and David Jones for the murder and robbery of a
former Brighton, New York police officer, Wayne Clapp. 7 Clapp
had lived in this small county his entire life and had developed
close ties in its rural communities. Although his boat was found
bullet-ridden in Seneca Lake, authorities never located his body.
The case attracted strong public interest. As a result, there was
considerable press coverage of the case before and after the arrests.
On July 22, 1976, defendants were arrested in Michigan. The news
media revealed that the defendants had led police to the murder
weapon and further reported that they had made admissions or
confessions while in Michigan. 8
These incriminating statements, as well as the physical evidence seized, were the subjects of a pretrial suppression hearing.
The defendants, aware of the extensive publicity already generated
by the case, and sensitive to the prejudicial nature of the evidence
which would be presented at the hearing, 9 moved to exclude the
public and the press from the proceedings. The Seneca County
Court granted the motion, noting that there would be a reasonable
probability of prejudice to the defendants if the evidence challenged at the suppression hearing were made public.
Four days after the exclusionary order was issued, the Gannett
Company, a newspaper publisher, was granted permission to be
heard concerning the propriety of the closure of the hearing.1 0 Gannett contended that the exclusionary order unconstitutionally
abridged its right to freedom of the press."1 Since the purpose and
effect of the order was to prohibit the media from disseminating information adduced at the hearing, Gannett argued that the order
constituted a prior restraint on the press. As such, it would be presumptively unconstitutional. 12 Further, Gannett maintained that
concomitant with the constitutional right of the press to disseminate
7. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 375, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No.

77-1301).
8. Id. at 374-75, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
9. Such evidence could be particularly damaging to a defendant if, after prospective jurors have learned of the evidence, it were found to be unconstitutionally
obtained, and thus excluded from the trial.
10. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 374-75, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546,
401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (1977), cert. granted,46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No.
77-1301).
11. See Brief for Respondent at 21-29.
12. See notes 74-82 infra and accompanying text.
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information is the right to gather information. By denying the media
access to information ordinarily available to the general public,
Gannett contended, the order abridged this right.
The county court rejected all arguments presented by the
press, leaving the exclusionary order intact. On appeal, the appellate division reversed the decision of the county court. 13 The case,
although moot by this time, 14 was then appealed to the court of
appeals. In upholding the constitutionality of the order, the court
of appeals laid down a broad rule concerning when a court should
close pretrial evidentiary proceedings: "At the point where press
commentary on those hearings would threaten the impaneling of a
constitutionally impartial jury in the county of venue, pretrial
evidentiary hearings in this State are presumptively to be closed to
15
the public."'
Before analyzing the validity of the press's contentions, and
thus the conclusion reached by the court of appeals, it is necessary
to discuss three lines of Supreme Court cases: (1) the nature of the
problem caused by prejudicial publicity and the standards employed by the Supreme Court in determining whether an unfair
trial has resulted; (2) the Supreme Court's reaction to contempt
orders issued against the press by trial courts; and (3) the Court's
treatment of prior restraints -on the press which have taken the
form of "gag" orders 1 6 issued to prevent comment relating to judicial proceedings.
THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE TO THE
PROBLEM OF PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution 17 guarantee an accused the right to a "fair trial in a fair

13.

Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (4th Dep't

1976), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1301).

14. The codefendants had already pleaded guilty to lesser included crimes in
satisfaction of the indictment pending against them.
15. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 762 (1977) (emphasis added), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S.
May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1301).
16. A gag order is a judicial mandate that restricts the release of information
concerning an ongoing criminal proceeding. See text accompanying notes 74-89 infra.
17. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .a ..

public trial, by an impartial jury .... A fair trial by an impartial jury has long been
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tribunal." 18 The constitutional standard of fairness requires an "impartial, 'indifferent' [jury]."' 19 To fulfill this requirement, each juror
must base his verdict solely upon "the evidence developed at the
trial."20 Adverse publicity may debilitate a defendant's right to a
fair trial. 2 ' Prospective jurors, exposed to pretrial press accounts,
may form an opinion as to guilt or innocence before entering the
courtroom. Jurors may gather extrajudicial "evidence" which is
either not presented in court or is not subject to protective re22
straints such as cross-examination.
On several occasions the Supreme Court has considered the
prejudicial effect of uncontrolled publicity on an accused's right to
an impartial jury. 23 The Court, however, has suggested no set formula for ascertaining whether a defendant has received a fair trial.
"Impartiality is not a technical conception." 24 Thus a case-by-case
analysis must be undertaken to determine whether the facts support a conclusion of prejudice.
In Irvin v. Dowd,2 5 the Supreme Court reversed a murder
conviction obtained in a community which had been subject to intense, prejudicial publicity. The Court found that " 'deep and bitter prejudice'" had infected the entire community. 26 Ninety percent of the prospective jurors entertained some opinion as to guilt.
Of the twelve finally selected as jurors, eight believed prior to trial

considered a basic component of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2, and thus applicable to proceedings in state
courts. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
18. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
19. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
20. Id.
21. See Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of PretrialPublicity on Jurors'
Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM iN AMERICA 123 (R. Simon ed. 1975). The authors
conducted a study using experimental juries and found that jurors exposed to prejudicial news coverage were twice as likely to find a defendant guilty than those who
had read nonprejudicial news accounts. Id. at 132-35.
22. Other protective devices that either bar or limit evidence presented at trial
include the various exclusionary rules of evidence, for example, the hearsay rules
and the rule prohibiting improperly extracted confessions. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
802. See also Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (jurors were exposed,
through news accounts, to information not admitted at trial). The Court maintained
that the prejudice from such material may be greater than when it is part of the prosecution's evidence "for it is then not tempered by protective procedures." Id. at 313.
23. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
24. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
25. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
26. Id. at 727.
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that the defendant was guilty. 2 7 Although each juror maintained
that he could be fair and impartial, the Court recognized: "The
influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that
it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the
average man." 28 In such a pervasively prejudicial atmosphere, a
juror's claim of impartiality was given little weight. 29 In light of
these circumstances, the Court found that actual prejudice rendered a fair trial impossible. Consequently, the defendant was
found to have been denied due process of law, and the conviction
was reversed.
In a line of cases following Irvin, the Supreme Court continued to recognize the psychological impact that pretrial publicity
can have on a jury. 30 This led the Court to dispense, under certain
circumstances, with the necessity of finding actual prejudice as a
prerequisite to finding a violation of the defendant's right to a fair
trial. As the Court declared in Estes v. Texas:3 1 "[I]n most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we require a showing of
identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." 3 2 Thus, prejudice may be presumed under certain circumstances.
The rationale applied in Estes is relevant in analyzing the result in Gannett. Pretrial publicity was not the main problem in
Estes. 3 Rather, the Court focused on the effect of television coverage on a defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court held that use of
television in its present stage of technological development within
27. Id.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 728.
30. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
31. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
32. Id. at 542-43. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), where the Court

held that televising defendant's confession violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The defense did not have to prove actual prejudice because
the Court concluded that such a procedure was inherently prejudicial, and therefore
produced an unfair trial. In Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), the Court reversed a conviction where two key witnesses were deputy sheriffs as well as bailiffs
during the trial. Again, no actual prejudice was shown, but the Court asserted that "it
would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this
continual association" even if, as the deputies swore, they had not discussed the case
with members of the jury. Id. at 473.
33. The case did, however, receive national attention.
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a courtroom denied the accused due process of law. The Court

declared that the right to a fair trial is the most fundamental of

freedoms, 3 4 and that "the life or liberty of any individual in this
land should not be put in jeopardy because of actions of any news
media. "'3 5 This case thus presented a direct confrontation between
one medium's access to the courtroom and the right of an accused
to a fair trial.
The Court's conclusion, which necessarily resulted in prohibiting the use of television cameras in a courtroom to satisfy due
process requirements, can be distinguished from an order which
excludes all media from a judicial proceeding. Indeed, the Court
was careful to note the important function the press serves in the
courtroom. The opinion was issued with the understanding that
representatives from all media would have access to the courtroom.
As the Supreme Court stated, "the public has the right to be in-

formed as to what occurs in its courts.... [Rieporters of all media,
including television, are always present if they wish to be and are
plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court .... " 3 6
Perhaps the most significant decision in this area is Sheppard
v. Maxwell. 3 7 In this case, a barrage of irresponsible and prejudicial publicity combined with a "carnival atmosphere" 38 in the courtroom, rendering a fair trial impossible. In reversing the convic-

tion, the Supreme Court admonished the trial judge for his failure
to exercise stricter control over the proceedings to secure the " 'ju34. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
35. Id. (quoting Brief for Amici curiae, National Association of Broadcasters and
the Radio Television News Directors Association, at 3-4).
36. Id. at 541-42.
37. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Sheppard involved the murder of petitioner's wife,
Marilyn Sheppard. From the outset, officials were suspicious of Sheppard. Newspapers carried stories declaring that he was totally uncooperative with law enforcement
authorities and denouncing those authorities for failing to take immediate steps to
apprehend Sheppard. The coroner subpoenaed Sheppard and staged a three-day inquest at the school gymnasium which was broadcast live. Sheppard was questioned
for five and one-half hours in front of reporters and photographers about the events
that transpired on the night of the murder as well as a love affair in which he was
involved. Critical news stories continued, providing information, much of which was
untrue and never presented at trial. At trial, a temporary table was set up inside the
bar at which representatives of the media were stationed. Throughout the course of
the trial, reporters shuffled into and out of the courtroom regularly, constantly disrupting the proceedings. The trial judge made no attempt to prevent this. In addition, he refused to grant petitioner a change of venue and failed to sequester the jury
adequately. Under these circumstances, petitioner maintained, his constitutional
right to a fair trial had been violated. See id. at 335-49.
38. Id. at 358.
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dicial serenity and calm to which [the defendant is] entitled.' "9
To insure this entitlement, the Court, relying on Estes, concluded
that the presence and conduct of the press at judicial proceedings
could be limited if the accused would be disadvantaged otherwise. 40 In addition, for the first time the Court articulated definitive steps a trial judge should take to ameliorate the effect of prejudicial publicity. In sensational cases, motions for change of venue
and postponement should be liberally granted. A trial judge,
aware of the influence of prejudicial publicity, should also give
thorough jury instructions and sequester the jury once the trial begins. 41 Furthermore, although "nothing . . . proscribes the press
from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom,"-4 2 the trial
judge in Sheppard could have "proscribed extrajudicial statements
by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters. ... "43 Thus, the Supreme Court again endorsed a
method of restricting media access to certain information to secure
an impartial jury. In an extremely strong comment, however, the
Court firmly supported media attendance at judicial proceedings:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive
record of service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. This
Court has, therefore, been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media
44
for "[iw]hat transpires in the court room is public property."
Nothwithstanding the foregoing cases, the Supreme Court has
never suggested that an unfair trial necessarily results in all cases
in which jurors are exposed to adverse publicity. The Court in
Irvin made this clear when it determined:
It is not required . . . that the jurors be totally ignorant of
the facts and issues involved . . . . To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 355 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965)).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
Id. at 362-63.
Id.

43. Id. at 361.
44. Id. at 350 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). See also text
accompanying notes 143-149 infra.
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an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption
of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 45
This remark assumes that an independent examination of the record of a given case will be undertaken to determine whether prejudice resulted. It can be argued that the cases following Irvin,46
which recognized presumptively prejudicial circumstances, enervated the importance of this remark. Indeed, the Court in Estes
maintained that it had departed from the approach articulated in
Irvin by dispensing with a careful examination of the facts to determine whether actual prejudice had resulted. 4 7
The Irvin approach, however, was revived in Murphy v.
Florida.48 There, the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction even
though the jury had been exposed to considerable prejudicial publicity prior to trial. 49 The Court noted that juror exposure to information concerning defendant's prior convictions did not in itself
presumptively deprive him of due process. 50 Thus, the circumstances in which bias is presumed were limited, reversing the
trend initiated in Rideau v. Louisiana5 ' and continuing through
Sheppard.52 The Court then examined the voir dire record to determine whether the facts supported a finding of actual prejudice.
It concluded that no juror hostility had been expressed, and, unlike
the situation surrounding the trial in Irvin, community sentiment
was not so inflamed as to rebut the indicia of impartiality found in
53
the voir dire transcript.
Murphy is problematic because the trial court failed to em45. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961) (citations omitted).
46. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
47. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965).
48. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
49. The jurors had learned from news accounts of prior robbery convictions of
the accused. Id. at 797.
50. Id. at 799.
51. 373 U.S. 723 (1963). See note 32 supra.
52. The Court did not specify what distinguished Murphy from the "implied
bias" cases. Hence, the circumstances under which prejudice will be presumed are
undefined. One might argue that Murphy limits the application of this standard to
circumstances in which either the state is instrumental in creating a prejudicial atmosphere, for example, by allowing television cameras in the courtroom, or the trial
court is blatantly remiss in its duty to protect an accused's right to a fair trial. See,
e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
53. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-01 (1975).
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ploy the procedures delineated in Sheppard to minimize the impact of pretrial publicity. The court was derelict in its duty to insulate prospective jurors from the news media. In addition, it made
no attempt to prevent pretrial discussion of defendant's prior rec54
ord among the jury members.
As the preceding cases demonstrate, pretrial publicity alone
may be insufficient grounds for a constitutional violation. The nature and intensity of the exposure, coupled with the remedial
measures employed by the trial court, will be evaluated to determine whether an impartial jury was retained. In addition, although
certain physical equipment of the media may be barred from the
courtroom and the number of representatives restricted, the Supreme Court has never suggested that the press may be totally
excluded from the courtroom. To the contrary, even in cases where
the most irresponsible journalistic methods have been displayed,
the Court has firmly emphasized the necessary role of the press in
judicial proceedings.
RESTRAINTS OR PUNISHMENTS
DIRECTED AGAINST

THE PRESS

The Contempt Cases
The Supreme Court has noted that the "proper administration
of justice 55 is of primary concern. However, in the past thirty-five
years, the Court has not tolerated judicial orders that restrict freedom of the press to assure this concern. Contempt orders issued by
courts against the press for alleged interference with the administration of justice have met stiff constitutional opposition from the
Supreme Court. These orders sanction the press subsequent to the
release of the objectionable publication. The contempt cases bear
two common characteristics: They involve nonjury trials and the
offending remarks which precipitated the contempt orders were
designed either to pressure a trial judge regarding his decision in a
pending case or to criticize a judge for action he has taken in a
case.
Bridges v. California5 6 concerned a Los Angeles Times publication of three editorials that denounced two labor leaders who
54. Id. at 804 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (quoting Brief for Amici Curiae,

National Association of Broadcasters and the Radio Television News Directors Association, at 3-4).
56. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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were awaiting a probation hearing and sentencing. The paper
warned the trial judge that it would be a serious mistake to grant
the defendants probation. This case also involved publication in
California newspapers of a statement by Bridges, an officer of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), while a motion for a
new trial was pending. The statement criticized the decision of the
trial court regarding labor disputes. Bridges referred to the decision as outrageous and threatened that if it were enforced a strike
57
by the union was likely to follow.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles held both the Times and
Bridges in contempt. 58 On appeal, the Supreme Court of California, aware of the intimidating effect such remarks might have on a
judge's ability to remain impartial, affirmed the contempt citations.
The court found a "reasonable tendency" 5 9 that the orderly administration of justice would be obstructed. However, because first
amendment freedoms were implicated, the United States Supreme
Court applied the stricter "clear and present danger"6 0 test in reversing the contempt rulings. Under this standard, "the substantive
evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."6 1 The Court concluded that judges are generally endowed with fortitude and are
unlikely to be intimidated by newspaper commentary. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that because the case was controversial,
the trial judge might reasonably expect comment upon the completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court maintained that comment
issued before resolution of the case would not have substantial impact on the judge. 6 2 Thus, the fair administration of justice was not
adversely affected and the publications were found to be protected
by the first amendment.
In two cases following Bridges, judicial imperviousness to public comment became the sole basis for reversing contempt convictions. In Pennekamp v. Florida,63 the Supreme Court assumed, for
the purpose of argument, that petitioner's editorials had deliber64
ately distorted facts to disrupt the efficiency of the courtroom.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 276-77.
See id. at 254 (summary of argument for petitioner).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 273.
328 U.S. 331 (1946).
Id. at 345.
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Nevertheless, the Court found that the editorials in question did
not present a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice.6 5
In Craig v. Harney,66 a newspaper editorially criticized a
judge's decision as a "travesty on justice 67 and implied that the
judge would not continue to serve much longer if such action persisted. Distinguishing Bridges, the trial court made a specific finding that the nature of the dispute gave the judge no warning of the
subsequent publication. 68 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court maintained that a judge of reasonable fortitude simply could not be affected by such remarks.6 9 The Court apparently dispensed with the
need to show judicial awareness of forthcoming criticism to invalidate contempt orders.
In nonjury trials, it is difficult to imagine a factual setting
which would constitute a clear and present danger, thereby permitting a contempt citation. Indeed, commentators and lower courts
have concluded that the foregoing cases absolutely protect all
70
judge-related commentary.
The rationale of the contempt cases is based on the Court's
sensitivity to the chilling effect contempt orders have on freedom
of expression. In Bridges, the Court maintained that subsequent
punishment could be as effective in curtailing expression as prior
censorship. Contempt orders give the press no specific guidelines
defining the scope of permissible comment. This necessarily results
in a system of self-censorship broader than that required to
71
safeguard against contempt orders.
The Court was particularly protective of first amendment
rights in these cases because of the nature of the communications.
In Craig, the Court emphasized the need for public comment on
governmental institutions:
65. Id. at 350.
66. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
67.

Id. at 369.

68. Id. at 371.
69. Id. at 376.
70.

See, e.g., Goss v. State, 204 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd on other

grounds, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963). "The construction given the 'clear and present
danger rule' leads one to believe that the bend [sic] of the Supreme Court's thinking
is that both State and Federal Courts be almost entirely precluded from punishing by
contempt all out of court statements whatsoever." Id. at 273. See also Barist, The
First Amendment and Regulation of PrejudicialPublicity-An Analysis, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 425, 429 (1968).
71. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941).
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A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is
public property. . .

There is no special perquisite of the

judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor
events which transpire in proceedings before it.
Judges who stand for reelection run on their records....
Discussion of their conduct is appropriate,
Criticism is expected.
72
if not necessary.
The preceding cases do not foreclose the use of contempt orders in jury trials. The Supreme Court has hinted that a more liberal standard may be used to determine if contempt orders should
be issued in such cases. 73 Indeed, the rationale employed in
Bridges does not apply to jury trials. The fortitude imputed to a
judge is a result of his being an elected or appointed public official
who knowingly seeks an inherently controversial position. A juror
is in no such position. He presumably may be more influenced by
external disturbances. Therefore, a clear and present danger to a
fair trial may more readily exist in a jury trial.
PriorRestraint on the Press-Gag Orders
The Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart7 4 is most directly analogous to the situation in Gannett. In
Stuart, the Court considered an order issued by a state district
judge restraining the media from publishing specified information
gathered during the course of a preliminary hearing and from outside sources. 75 As in Gannett, the purpose of the order was to
secure a fair trial. The Court characterized the gag order as a prior
restraint on speech 76 since it directly prohibited publication or
broadcast of particular information. As such, it bore a heavy pre77
sumption of unconstitutionality.
72.
73.

Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 377 (1947).
See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1962).

74. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
75. The specific language of the order as finally construed by the Nebraska
Supreme Court proscribed publishing: (1) confessions or admissions made by defendant to law enforcement personnel; (2) confessions or admissions made to any third
parties except members of the press; and (3) other facts "strongly implicative" of the

accused. Id. at 545.
76.

Id. at 556.

77. Id. at 558. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), where the Court
maintained that the main purpose of the first amendment is "to prevent all such

previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments."
Id. at 462 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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Although the Court has never suggested that first amendment
rights are absolute,1 8 it has maintained that prior restraints represent the "essence of censorship"7 9 and thus are "the most serious
80
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."
Justice Brennan quoted one commentator to describe the Court's
deep-seated hostility toward prior restraints:
"A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than
a system of subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under
government scrutiny a far wider range of expression; it shuts off
communication before it takes place; . .. the system allows less
opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the dynamics of
the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship
shows. "81

Thus, a prior restraint is devastating not only because it prevents
someone from expressing himself, but because it prevents others
82
from hearing what he has to say.
In determining whether the restrictive order overcame the
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, the Court in Stuart
analyzed four factors: (1) the extent of the publicity and its impact on
potential jurors; (2) the availability and effectiveness of alternative
remedies; (3) the effectiveness of the order; 3 and (4) the vagueness
and breadth of the order.8 4 The Court conceded that the trial
judge was justified in finding that there was intense and pervasive
pretrial publicity which might have impaired the defendant's right
to a fair trial.8 5 The Court noted, however, that the impact the
publicity would have on prospective jurors was necessarily speculative.8 6 Thus, the Court concluded that "it is not clear that further
publicity, unchecked, would so distort the views of potential jurors
that 12 could not be found who would . . . fulfill their sworn duty
to render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in
78. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1969); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
79. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). See generally New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
80. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
81. Id. at 589-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting T. EMERSON, TIE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 506 (1970)).
82. See text accompanying notes 126-140 infra.
83. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
84. Id. at 568.
85. Id. at 563.
86. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1013

open court."8 7 The Court admonished the Nebraska state courts for
failing to determine whether alternative measures, short of prior
89
restraint,8 8 could have mitigated the effect of adverse publicity.
The use of affirmative steps would have been consistent with the
constitutional policy of giving "[f]reedom of discussion . . . the
widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair
and orderly administration of justice." 90 Among the alternatives
sanctioned by the Court were those discussed in Sheppard v.
Maxwell. 9 In addition, the majority opinion, 92 and the concurring
opinion of Justice Brennan,9 3 called for more extensive voir dire
examination in sensational cases. As in Sheppard, the Court implied that faithful adherence to these steps would satisfactorily
94
eliminate the problem of pretrial publicity in virtually every case.
The Court also concluded that the restrictive order was vague
and overbroad9 5 and would likely be ineffective.96 Based on the
above conclusions, the Court held that insofar as the order prohibited reporting evidence adduced in open court, it was clearly
unconstitutional, since " 'nothing. . .proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom.' "97 As for inform ation obtained from outside sources, the heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality was not overcome. 9 8 Thus, the Court applied
differing constitutional treatment depending upon the source of
the information. This is indicative of the special protection afforded
commentary relating to judicial proceedings. Although the Court
left open the possibility that a gag order on extrajudicial information might, under extreme conditions, be constitutional, 99 the sensational nature of the facts of Stuart undercut the possibility that
such circumstances will ever exist. 19 ° Stuart can be read on at least
87. Id. at 569.
88. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
89. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976).
90. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
91. 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966), cited in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976); see text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
92. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976).
93. Id. at 602 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 564-65, 569.
95. Id. at 568. The "strongly implicative" clause was thought to be overbroad
and too vague.
96. Id. at 566-67.
97. Id. at 568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966)).
98. Id. at 570.
99. Id.
100. Unlike Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401
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two levels: first, as strongly opposing the use of prior restraints,
and second, as a forceful recognition of the public's need to
scrutinize the criminal justice system.' 0 1
Notwithstanding the Court's endorsement of rigorous comment
concerning judicial proceedings, both the majority opinion' 02 and
the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan' 0 3 explicitly left open
whether the courtroom may be closed to both the press and the
public. The Court thereby invited lower courts to adopt this procedure.' 0 4 In addition, the Supreme Court's continued approval of
judicial action designed to control access to information indicates
a willingness to distinguish the right of the press to disseminate and
publish information it has gathered from its right to gather the in05
formation at all.'
AN ANALYSIS OF

Gannett

The Court of Appeals of the State of New York accepted the
invitation in Gannett by upholding the trial court's exclusion of the
press from a pretrial evidentiary hearing. An exclusionary order
denies the press access to information, whereas traditional prior
restraints prohibit the release of information already gathered. The
court of appeals held that if press commentary would threaten a
defendant's right to a fair trial, pretrial evidentiary proceedings
will be presumptively closed to the public. 1' The court based this
broad conclusion on "the court's inherent power to control their
own process.' 0 7 While conceding that "criminal trials are preN.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 771301), Stuart received national attention. It involved the murder of a family of six

and was considered the most sensational crime in Nebraska in the last 20 years.
Nevertheless at least three, and possibly five, of the justices thought that prior restraints were absolutely barred as a method of securing a fair trial. See Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (White, J., concurring); id. at 572
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. See text accompanying notes 143-160 infra.
102. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 n.8 (1976).
103. Id. at 576 n. 3 (Brennan, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Brennan asserted
that the conflict involved in closing preliminary hearings was with the public trial
clause of the sixth amendment. This suggests that he did not perceive any first
amendment infirmity resulting from the issuance of an exclusionary order.
104. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. jerome, 98 S. Ct. 546 (1978)
(per curiam); id. at 54749 (Rehnquist & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
105. See text accompanying notes 35 & 43 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
107. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No.
77-1301).
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sumptively open to the public," 10 8 the court asserted that the
right to a public trial is primarily for the benefit of the accused and
was "never intended to comprehend outside interference with orderly judicial process."' 10 9 Thus, to insure the " 'integrity of the
trial,' "110 the court implied that it is the affirmative obligation of
the trial judge to close evidentiary hearings if the defendant's right
to a fair trial is threatened, unless the press can demonstrate that
the case is of overwhelming "legitimate public interest." ' 1 The
court thereby created an additional measure to those outlined in
Sheppard and Stuart to secure an impartial jury.
112
The Court concluded that the first amendment contentions
presented were frivolous. The merits of the media's claims were
dealt with summarily. Stuart required the majority in Gannett to
admit that " 'barriers to prior restraint remain high.' "113 The court
distinguished Stuart by maintaining that that case involved an attempt to prohibit comment on known facts. Since "[r]eporters had
attended [a] 'public event,' "114 they could " 'report it with impunity.' "115 Gannett reasoned that such a result does not preclude a
court from restricting access to facts which, if published, would
present a "threat to the impaneling of a constitutionally impartial
117
jury." 116 This was the extent of the court's analysis of this issue.
The court subjected exclusionary orders to less rigorous constitutional scrutiny than gag orders, even though both result in
108. Id. The public trial clause of the sixth amendment applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
109. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 377, 372 N.E.2d 544, 548, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No.
77-1301).
110. Id. (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
111. Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
112. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
113. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 379, 372 N.E.2d 544, 549, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 761 (1977) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570
(1976)), cert. granted,46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1301).
114. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 379, 372 N.E.2d 544, 549, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 761 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 771301).
115. Id. at 379, 372 N.E.2d at 549, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
116. Id. at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
117. The court had already concluded that the order did not violate the public
trial clause of the sixth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. The court reasoned that the right is mostly for the benefit of the accused, and thus could be waived, and that it had always been flexibly applied, giving
way to other important interests. See id. at 376-78, 372 N.E.2d at 547-48, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 759-61.
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limiting dissemination of information by the press to the general
public. The court failed to articulate its rationale for this distinction. It is thus necessary to examine the distinguishing characteristics of each to determine whether different constitutional treatment
is justified.
The limits of the constitutional protection accorded the press's
right to gather information are unclear. The Supreme Court has
held: "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information." 118 The Court expanded
this idea in Branzburg v. Hayes'1 9 where it maintained that "the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the public
generally."' 120 However, it recognized that gathering information,
which includes access to news sources, requires some first amendment protection: "[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the
12 1
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.'
Those who would confer no constitutional privilege consider
the freedoms of speech and press to be coextensive. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has tended to equate them under the general heading of "freedom of expression.' 1 2 By treating speech and press in
this manner, it might be argued that the only relevant question
is whether any right to expression has directly been abridged.
With regard to the press, only a gag order is necessarily intolerable because it directly limits dissemination of information
already gathered by the press. As an abstract proposition, it makes
some sense to maintain a stricter standard against invasions of
speech and publication than against restrictions of access to information. Freedom of expression prohibits the state from invading

118.

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).

119. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
120. Id. at 684 (citations omitted). In Branzburg, the press asserted that it pos-

sessed a constitutional privilege to conceal confidential sources and information
from a grand jury. The press argued that revelation of sources would have an adverse
effect on its ability to gather information in the future. The Court concluded that the
first amendment does not relieve the press of the obligation that all citizens have to
respond to a grand jury subpoena, and answer questions relevant to criminal investigations, even if it requires revealing information secured through confidential
sources.
121. Id. at 681.
122. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964); see generally Note, The Right of the Press
to Gather Information, 71 COLM. L. REv. 838 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1974).
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"'the sphere of intellect and spirit ....

' "123 Hence, the first
amendment is an extremely personal right, which, as such, is an
end in itself. Preventing governmental regulation that restricts
what one says and ultimately thinks is an essential purpose of the
amendment. 124 To safeguard this freedom, government action
which "chills" or "freezes"'12 5 expression is prohibited, regardless of
how inappropriate or nonnewsworthy the utterance may appear to
be. On the other hand, it would be foolish to require that access to
private or nonnewsworthy information be provided. However, access to such public events as the preliminary hearing in Gannett
must be protected by the constitutional right to gather information.
In any event, the exclusionary order as issued in Gannett directly abridges freedom of expression. The order was applied to prevent the expression of inherently suspect utterances.126 The court's
rationale indicates that an exclusionary order may'be used at any
stage of the trial. The inhibiting influence this may have on the
press in reporting on future proceedings is evident. The media
cannot survive without access to information, If advised that they
may be cut off from traditional channels of information because of
the speech they publish, the media are likely to temper their
speech. Fear of exclusion may have an effect similar to that of a
contempt order. The press may become overly self-censoring to
avoid being barred from future 'judicial proceedings. In Oliver v.
Postel,12 7 a decision predating Gannett, the New York Court of
Appeals recognized this effect:

[The trial Judge's] order closing the trial .

could not help but

have a deterrent effect on free discussion by the press, substantially similar to that which would have resulted had punishment
for contempt been imposed. Accordingly .... it could stand only

upon a clear showing-similar to that required to sustain a contempt order-that it was necessary to meet "a serious and immi128
nent threat" to "the integrity of the trial."
123. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (quoting West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).

124. This is not, however, the only purpose underlying the protection given
first amendment rights. See text accompanying notes 135-142 infra.
125. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). The Court felt
that criminal or civil sanctions chilled speech, while prior restraints froze it.

126. The fear was that the press would reveal evidence introduced at the suppression hearing.
127. 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972).
128. Id. at 180-81, 282 N.E.2d at 310, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (1972) (quoting Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373, 377 (1947)).
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This standard was obviously not applied in Gannett. Rather, the
court relied on a more relaxed reasonable tendency test, 12 9 similar
to that rejected by the Supreme Court in the contempt cases.
More directly, the use of an exclusionary order under the circumstances in Gannett is the functional equivalent of a prior
restraint on speech or publication. The order was executed to suppress expression concerning an event of public interest. As implemented, it restricted all expression by the press, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. The public thereby received no information from which to observe, ponder, and discuss the operations of
government. That the restraint on expression took the form of an
exclusionary order, rather than a more direct gag order, should not
be determinative of the first amendment issue. When first amendment questions arise, a court must look beyond the form of an
order to its substance, thereby analyzing its effect and operation. 130
The appellate division recognized this when Gannett was before it:
Logic compels the conclusion that where an exclusionary order
is entered merely as a substitute for a "gag order" which would
otherwise place a direct restraint on what the press can publish,
such exclusionary order infringes upon protected First Amendment rights. An exclusionary order is merely a substitute for a
direct prior restraint where, as here, the sole purpose behind
of what transpires in the
the order is to prevent the publication
131
courtroom during a pretrial hearing.
Thus, an exclusionary order only differs from other prior and subsequent restraints on the press in the manner in which it stifles
freedom of expression.
The issue is not whether to make information public in the
first instance. Rather, we are dealing with judicial proceedings
which are, by their nature, public. "A trial is a public event. What
transpires in the court room is public property."' 13 2 This is not a
case, like Branzburg, where the press is demanding special access
129. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 762 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No.
77-1301).
130. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931); United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911).
131. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 111, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722
(4th Dep't 1976) (emphasis in original), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544,
401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 771301).
132. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
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to information generally unavailable to the public.133 Both the
press and the public ordinarily have the right to attend judicial
proceedings. Closing the courtroom restricts the press from receiving information that it normally has the right to have, thereby short
circuiting any expression concerning a public event. As such, it is
1 34
a serious backdoor threat to First Amendment interests."
Freedom of speech and press encompass more than the right
to think and speak as one pleases. Expression serves as a means for
a greater end. The constitutional safeguard of freedom of expression was "fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social change desired by the
people."'135 By stifling access to public information, courts defeat a
primary purpose of the first amendment. The first amendment protects communication in addition to expression. The constitutional
rights incorporated within it have been held particularly inviolate
to preserve broad discussion of political ideas and institutions.' 36
Discussion of ideas and public affairs needs roots. For freedom of
expression to be other than vacuous formality, information must be
furnished from which opinions are formulated and only then articulated. As Madison stated: "A popular government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy . . . . [A] people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives."137
This purpose of the first amendment is of particular importance regarding freedom of the press. Simply focusing on the per133.

Although the order excluded both the public and the press from the court-

room, a close reading of the decision suggests that the order was directed primarily,
if not exclusively, at the press. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370,

376-78, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547-48, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759-61 (1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1301). This is to state the obvious. The

problem is caused by the widespread publicity which results from the press coverage. Indeed, under such an order, a proceeding will be closed when comment by the
press threatens a fair trial. Id. at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762. It is
conceivable, therefore, that the general public could be admitted without upsetting a
defendant's right to an impartial jury, as long as the press is excluded. An order
which excludes only the press might present more blatant constitutional problems,
but none more forceful.
134. Tunney, Preface to STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2d SESS., REPORT III (Comm. Print
1976). .
135. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
136. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring).
137.

9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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sonal right of freedom of expression ignores the essential informative function served by the press. Since "each individual has but
limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of his government,' 13 8 the press is a necessary means by
which the public obtains such information. The Supreme Court has
emphasized this purpose in preserving an untrammelled press:
"[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity
afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with
grave concern." 1 9 Our concept of self-government, which is predicated upon the dissemination of information concerning the operation of government, relies on the press to supply this information.
"The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of gov140
ernment and inform the people."'
Recognizing the public service function of the press is essential
in a world that is growing more specialized and complex, where
decisions which affect our lives are often hidden from view. The exclusionary order permitted in Gannett puts a governmental body
in a self-regulating position to retain the secrets of its operations.
Recent disclosures concerning governmental improprieties 14 1 should
that the closure of traditionalserve as a continuing reminder
42
ly public events is intolerable. 1
Press coverage of the criminal justice system is particularly
important. The Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
138. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
139. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
140. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring). See T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th ed. 1927):
The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but
any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free
and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
141. "Watergate," disclosures of FBI and CIA scandals, congressional payoffs,
and similar improprieties provide prime examples.
142. The press as primary receiver and disseminator of vital information is in a
position of increasing power. It is no longer composed of the single crusader desirous of exposing the evils of society. Instead, it is a multimillion dollar oligarchic
conglomerate primarily motivated to increase circulation, and thereby accumulate
profit. Recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized this position of power. Indeed, in Stuart, Chief Justice Burger maintained that the press owed a fiduciary duty
to the public. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976). The obligations attending this duty and the sanctions available for breaching it are unclear.
Perhaps the Court will revert to allowing limited contempt decrees in jury trials. As
the function of the media continues to be perceived differently, the constitutional
protection allotted to it may change accordingly.
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Cohn 14 3 noted: "The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting
from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . .
are without question events of legitimate concern to the public and
consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report
the operations of government."'
More specifically, the Supreme
Court decisions dealing with suppression of press commentary on
judicial proceedings discussed earlier indicate that the holdings
were premised on the need for public scrutiny and discussion of
the judicial and prosecutorial branches of government. 145 An
exclusionary order undercuts a primary justification for the Court's
steadfast refusal to permit limitations on utterances published by
the press. Justice Brennan maintained in his concurring opinion to
Stuart:
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at
the core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with
the administration of government. Secrecy of judicial action can
only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the competance and impartiality of judges; free and
robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing
effects of exposure and public accountability.146
In no decision reversing a conviction due to prejudicial consequences of pretrial publicity has the Supreme Court sanctioned
total exclusion of the press as an appropriate means of guaranteeing
a fair trial.14 7 Instead, while criticizing the nature of the reporting
that transpired in each case, the Court has continuously supported
the need and right of the press to have access to the courtroom. In
Estes v. Texas,' 4 8 the decision which comes closest to authorizing
access restrictions on the press, the Court emphasized: "The free
press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in
governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and
143.

420 U.S. 469 (1975).

144. Id. at 492.
145. See text accompanying notes 56-100 supra.
146. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The majority in Stuart added: "Truthful reports of public
judicial proceedings have been afforded special protection against subsequent
punishment." Id. at 559.
147. See text accompanying notes 25-44 supra.
148. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events
and occurrences .... "149
Specifically, with regard to pretrial suppression hearings such
as that in Gannett, the major problem is not the reporting of evidence that is suppressed because it was derived through unconstitutional means, but the initial use of these means to secure evidence.' 5 0 As the dissenting opinion of Judge Cooke in Gannett
recognized: "The public has the right to know that the Constitution
protects equally each person accused of a crime, and has the right
to scrutinize the effectiveness of police agencies in coping with
criminal activity."'' 1 Moreover, "the testimony of police officers
regarding police conduct which usually occurs more or less in private within an environment which the police themselves create and
52
in which they reign, should not be given in secret.'
Press coverage of judicial operations does not merely result in
their reporting. It also serves to prevent abuses and illegalities that
might otherwise occur. The presence of the press and the public in
the courtroom has long been considered vital to secure a defendant
a fair trial. Historical distrust of secret tribunals is founded on the
15 3
fear of persecutorial oppressiveness thought to accompany them.
"The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."' 154 This attitude is
primarily responsible for the public trial clause of the sixth
amendment. 15 5 But this preventive role of the press is effective
only if nothing illegal occurs, that is, only when abuses are stymied
by the presence of the press. Consequently, since the protection
provided by the press is negative in character, it may not be immediately perceived.' 56 Permitting exclusionary orders may ulti149. Id. at 539. See also text accompanying notes 36 & 44 supra.
150. See generally A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME & PUBLICITY 238-40
(1967).
151. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 385, 372 N.E.2d 544, 553, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 765 (1977) (Cooke, J.,dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674
(U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1301).
152. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969).
153. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (footnote omitted): "Whatever
other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may
confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution."
154. Id. (footnote omitted).
155. See generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948).
156. The Jekyll-and-Hyde characteristics of the press as protector and
threatener of a fair trial are illustrated by the role of the press in the case of Lee

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1013

mately produce the most disastrous results for the rights of the
criminally accused. This would be particularly true if such an order
could be procured through a motion by the prosecution or the
court when opposed by the defendant.1 57 Gannett did not address
this issue, since the defendant requested the closure. However,
the rationale employed by the court could be read to support such
a result. 158
Whether an exclusionary order is ever appropriate, its application in Gannett is particularly distressing. Since information gathering does deserve some constitutional protection,' 59 and the "least
drastic means"' 6 0 of infringing first amendment rights should be
employed to secure other substantial rights, the order, as issued,
was overbroad. The court of appeals made no attempt to determine
if any of the alternative measures outlined in Sheppard and Stuart
could effectively protect the right to a fair trial. From the facts, it
appears that this case, at best, sparked intense local interest.' 6 1
Harvey Oswald. This case justifiably produced extreme criticism concerning press
coverage. "'The presence of the news media in the police buildings was not entirely

a negative factor in the course of events, however. A Texas lawyer has said in his 40
years of experience at the Texas bar, Oswald is to his knowledge the first man who
was held overnight by the police, and did not confess.'" A. FRIENDLY & R.
GOLDFARB, CRIME & PUBLICrrY 48 (1967) (quoting E. Rostow, Book Week, Nov. 22,
1964).
157. Many sensational or controversial cases, such as those involving Bobby
Seale, Huey Newton, Joanne Little, and Angela Davis, contain political and social
issues. Such cases are controversial by nature. The community may be predisposed
to convict the defendant before any widespread publicity is disseminated by the
press. In such cases publicity may be essential for a fair trial. A defense attorney must
be permitted to vocalize the cause of his client in an attempt to raise money from
sympathizers, and sympathizers must be afforded an opportunity to construct a positive image of the defendant in their community. See generally Garry & Riordan, Gag
Orders: Cui Bono?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1977).
158. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 377, 372 N.E.2d 544,
547-48, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May 1,
1978) (No. 77-1301). Furthermore, the ability to procure an exclusionary order may
put the defendant who desires not to waive his right to a public trial in a precarious
position. Since the court of appeals equates an exclusionary order with other procedures generally available to a trial judge, such as change of venue and postponement, defendant's failure to request such an order may weigh heavily in an appellate
court's later determination of whether prejudicial publicity rendered a fair trial impossible. See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), where the Court affirmed a conviction despite petitioner's claim that he received an unfair trial due to
prejudicial publicity. One reason for the affirmance was the defendant's failure to
seek a transfer of venue.
159. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
160. See, e.g., Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1961); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
161. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376-78, 372 N.E.2d 544,
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There is nothing to indicate that, if necessary, a change of venue
would have been insufficient to secure a fair trial. 162 Without
analysis of alternative measures, a procedure which at least indirectly infringes on first amendment freedoms is unconstitutional.
Moreover, with respect to the rights of the press, the public, and
ultimately the defendant, an exclusionary order has a more drastic
effect than either a contempt or gag order. It thus should either
not be contemplated as a remedy at all, or, at most, as the dissent
in Gannett insists, only upon a showing of a "compelling interest."
These conclusions, however, do not end the discussion. A
right to a fair trial may be the most fundamental of all freedoms.
Safeguarding this right in fact, not merely in words, must be actively sought. To this end, trial courts must diligently employ the
affirmative procedures outlined in Sheppard and Stuart. More emphasis should have been placed on using these procedures in Gannett, particularly since, under the circumstances of that case, a fair
trial within the county of venue was already in dire jeopardy. 163
The facts in Gannett illustrate that the effect of an exclusionary
order may be severely limited. "Criminal cases are not controversial because they are publicized; they are publicized because they
are controversial." 164 It may be difficult to restrain an entire community from discussing affairs intimately affecting it because
165
rumors would travel swiftly."
Aware of the problems attending sensational trials, courts have
focused increasing attention on the need for more extensive use of
voir dire examination accompanied by an expanded allowance of
peremptory challenges. Ultimately, greater use of such tools may
help to procure a fairer trial for all criminally accused. Sensational
crimes and trials are rare; conscious or unconscious juror prejudice
is not. A substantial proportion of prospective jurors enter the

547-48, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759-61 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. May

1, 1978) (No. 77-1301).
162.

The New York State Legislature has decided that the appellate division

should determine whether change of venue shall be granted. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw
§ 230.20 (McKinney 1971). It might be argued that this option is not open to a trial
judge. The Supreme Court rejected an analogous argument in Stuart. There, the
state legislature determined that a venue transfer could only be made to an adjacent
county. The Court held that state law regulating venue would have to yield, if necessary, to secure defendant a fair trial. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
563 n.7 (1976).
163. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
164. See Garry & Riordan, supra note 157, at 579.
165. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976).
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courtroom entertaining a preconceived notion of guilt, whether
familiar with the particular case or not. 16 6 Paradoxically, the publicity given the free press-fair trial controversy may have exposed
the need for a remedy for a more far-reaching problem; that of societal bias against the accused.
Justice Brennan, concurring in Stuart, strongly endorses the
use of detailed voir dire examination in sensational cases. He
suggests that specific questions be asked regarding the information a juror has learned about a crime.167 This is an important first
step. Studies reveal that beliefs may be formed based on minimal
information. 168 If upon questioning, a juror admits that he believes
a defendant is guilty, the juror should presumptively be considered partial. Attestations of impartiality should not govern for, as
already noted, opinions once formed unconsciously fight detachment. 16 9 In such a case, a challenge for cause should ordinarily be
granted, thereby excusing the prospective juror from the panel.
Extensive examination is also necessary to permit intelligent
use of peremptory challenges. Prospective jurors may either believe that an accused is guilty or harbor negative feelings toward an
accused, and yet not admit it upon voir dire examination. Prospective jurors often conceal biases because of a desire to be empaneled
on a jury,' 7 0 a reluctance to expose their bias or opinion to
others,' 71 or simply because they are unaware of them. Forceful
questioning may sometimes, but not always, reveal such prejudice.
166. See Garry & Riordan, supra note 157, at 580 n.20 (quoting Affidavit of Jay
Schulman, at 55-56, People v. Yoshimura, No. 52904 (Super Ct., Alameda County,
Cal., Apr. 12, 1972): " 'Pretrial surveys in judicial districts all over the country show
that... in a typical [venire] between 33 and 60 percent of the potential jurors start
off with a pro-prosecutorial or anti-defendant bias."'
167. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
168.

See D. KRECa & R. CRUTCHFIELD, ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 671-72

(1966).
169. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
170. See, e.g., Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S.
CAL. L. REv. 503, 526 (1965). The author maintains: "Once in a court, almost all
veniremen wanted to be selected and, in addition, most felt that being challenged
would adversely reflect upon their ability to be fair and impugn their good faith."
See also Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv.
545, 547 (1975): "[Ilt is part of the psychology of the venire for some people to decide that they want to be on the jury."
171. See Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493, 1506 (1975).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/5

26

Pacht: The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions in a Continuing

19781

FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL

Consequently, a greater number of peremptory challenges should
be allotted to the defense.
Justice Brennan suggests a number of other devices which
would help to make voir dire a vital safeguard for the criminally
accused. He maintains that the defense attorney should be given
more control over the examination.1 72 Generally, defense counsel
conduct more penetrating examinations than judges, and are therefore better able to uncover hidden prejudice.1 73 Furthermore,
questioning prospective jurors should, where appropriate, be conducted individually or in small groups. 174 This would avoid contaminating unbiased members of the panel when others reveal
prejudicial knowledge. In addition, such questioning would release
the prospective juror from the pressure of a group atmosphere and
thus facilitates honest response. 175 Voir dire examination may indicate the need for a temporary continuance, or a change of venue or
venire panel. 17 6 These procedures, if used in conjunction with
sequestration of the jury, intense jury instruction, and proper behavior by officers of the court,1 7 7 will best protect a defendant's
right to a fair trial. If in rare cases they are insufficient, reversal
is required. Failure to implement these procedures adequately in
a case of widespread publicity provides sufficient ground for
reversing a conviction through applying a standard of presumed
prejudice.
CONCLUSION

The execution of an exclusionary order appears overly drastic;
unlike gag orders, all, not merely prejudicial, comment is restricted from publication. The press is deprived of public information which it requires to sustain itself. In addition, the press may
be deterred from future investigations. The public lacks even a
general knowledge of what transpires in the proceedings; the main
antagonist to the right to a fair trial, unconstitutional police and
172. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
173. See Carry & Riordan, supra note 157, at 583 n. 2 8.
174. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).

175. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 602-03 (Brennan, J., concurring).
177. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
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judicial conduct, goes unobserved. Thus, the most deleterious
effects produced by the exclusionary order may be to the defendant
himself. A more sensitive trial court, employing techniques calculated to assure an impartial jury, is most important. The sensational trial merely illustrates the need for their more general implementation.
John Pacht
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